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OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 When Congress created the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines system, its purpose was to increase uniformity by 
establishing consistency between the actual conduct 
defendants committed and the sentences courts imposed.  
Although the Guidelines are now advisory, the goal remains 
the same: to channel sentencing discretion in order to produce 
consistent, disciplined decisions and avoid excessive 
sentencing disparities.  The realization of this purpose requires 
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principled application of the Guidelines.  The system works 
only if courts interpret the Guidelines in a manner faithful to 
the text the Sentencing Commission has promulgated.   
 
 In this case, we are charged with examining whether our 
interpretation of a particular Sentencing Guideline has 
comported with the Guideline’s text and advanced the system’s 
purpose.  Under Guideline § 3B1.3, courts are to impose a two-
level enhancement “[i]f the defendant abused a position of 
public or private trust . . . in a manner that significantly 
facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense.”  The 
commentary to § 3B1.3 in turn defines “position of public or 
private trust” as one “characterized by professional or 
managerial discretion (i.e., substantial discretionary judgment 
that is ordinarily given considerable deference).”  U.S.S.G. 
§ 3B1.3 cmt. n.1.  After Kenneth Douglas was convicted of 
conspiracy to distribute cocaine and conspiracy to engage in 
money laundering, the District Court in this case imposed the 
§ 3B1.3 enhancement, reasoning that Douglas had abused the 
special access granted to him by virtue of his position as an 
airline mechanic at the San Francisco International Airport.  
We, however, conclude that Douglas is not subject to the 
enhancement.  In so doing, we clarify our approach to cases 
involving § 3B1.3 and reiterate that the Guideline requires 
courts to first determine whether a defendant’s position was 
characterized by “professional or managerial discretion” 
before asking whether he abused the position to facilitate his 
crime.  Because Douglas’s position as an airline mechanic did 
not involve the requisite “professional or managerial 
discretion,” the enhancement does not apply in his case.  We 
will remand to the District Court for resentencing.   
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I. BACKGROUND 
 
 Sometime in 2008, Douglas approached his friend, 
Tywan Staples, and asked him if he had a way for Douglas to 
make some extra money.  Douglas and Staples had first met in 
1991, when they both worked at the Oakland International 
Airport Maintenance Base.  By 2008, both men were working 
aircraft maintenance for United Airlines at the San Francisco 
International Airport.  Staples worked at the airport’s 
maintenance base, and Douglas served as a mechanic at the 
terminal.   
 
 Staples knew of a potential way for Douglas to earn 
additional money.  For years, Staples and his cousin, Robert 
Russell Spence, had been operating a drug distribution scheme 
that transported cocaine from the Bay Area to Pittsburgh.  At 
first, Staples used the U.S. Postal Service and common carriers 
to ship cocaine to Spence in Pittsburgh, and Spence shipped 
the proceeds from the subsequent drug sales back to California.  
But after law enforcement intercepted two packages in 2007, 
the conspiracy began to transport the drugs and money using 
couriers on commercial airline flights in and out of Oakland 
International Airport.   
 
 This new system soon ran into trouble as well.  In 
February 2008, a shipment of nineteen kilograms of cocaine 
was lost during a layover in Las Vegas.  The following month, 
police seized from couriers two packages containing a total of 
$235,360.   
 
 With these recent setbacks fresh in his mind, Staples 
thought it might be wise to begin using the San Francisco 
airport as the base of operations.  So he asked Douglas if he 
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was able to get bags through the San Francisco airport without 
being searched.  Douglas responded that he was.  Douglas in 
fact had an Airport Operation Authority (“AOA”) badge, 
which allowed him to access the terminal without going 
through a Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) 
checkpoint.  To enter the terminal, Douglas swiped his badge 
through a card reader and placed his palm and fingers on a 
biometric hand pad.  After the reader approved his badge and 
all five fingers matched up with his identity from the badge, 
the door to the terminal would unlock.  On a random basis, the 
TSA would search employees entering the terminal through 
these secured employee entrances, but generally, Douglas was 
able to enter the terminal without being screened.   
 
 Staples did not have similar access to the terminal at the 
San Francisco airport, so he knew Douglas would be a 
significant addition to the conspiracy.  Staples offered to pay 
Douglas to smuggle cocaine into the terminal.  Douglas agreed 
to do so.   
 
 Staples and Douglas subsequently developed a 
straightforward arrangement.  Typically, Staples would deliver 
between ten and thirteen kilograms of cocaine to Douglas’s 
house in a sports bag filled with clothing.  Douglas would 
subsequently take the bag to the airport and enter through the 
secured employee entrance to the terminal.  Inside the terminal, 
Douglas would sit down next to the courier and place the bag 
on the ground between them.  Douglas would then leave, and 
the courier would take the bag and continue onto an eastbound 
flight.  Staples later testified that Douglas smuggled cocaine 
into the terminal this way roughly forty to fifty times.  On some 
of those occasions, Douglas also served as the courier, taking 
the drugs to Pittsburgh himself.  Each time Douglas got the 
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cocaine into the airport, he was paid $5,000.  He earned an 
additional $5,000 when he flew with the drugs to Pittsburgh.   
 
 Relying on airline records, the Government eventually 
identified forty-six flights departing from the San Francisco 
airport that were involved with the drug scheme.  Douglas was 
a passenger on seventeen of those flights, sometimes using 
employee benefit tickets.  In several instances, Douglas 
returned to San Francisco between twelve and twenty-four 
hours after his original departure flight, spending mere hours 
at the other destination.  The timing of Douglas’s flights also 
coincided with the timing of telephone calls with Staples and 
deposits into Douglas’s bank account.   
 
 A grand jury ultimately returned an indictment against 
Douglas and twenty-one co-defendants.  Douglas was charged 
with conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to 
distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 846, and conspiracy to engage in money laundering, 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h).  After a bench trial, 
Douglas was convicted on both counts.   
 
 Prior to sentencing, the Probation Office submitted a 
pre-sentence investigation report (“PSR”) that recommended 
Douglas be held responsible for 450 kilograms of cocaine, 
resulting in a base offense level of 38.  The PSR then called for 
three two-level enhancements for (1) money laundering in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956, pursuant to U.S.S.G. 
§ 2S1.1(b)(2)(B); (2) abuse of a position of public or private 
trust, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3; and (3) obstruction of 
justice, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.  The PSR explained that 
the enhancement for abuse of a position of trust applied 
because Douglas had taken advantage of his security clearance 
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and employment as an airline mechanic to smuggle drugs into 
the airport.   
 
 Douglas objected to the calculation of the amount of 
drugs and the enhancements for abuse of a position of public 
or private trust and obstruction of justice.  The District Court, 
however, overruled those objections at sentencing.  It 
concluded that Douglas used his “position of trust with the 
airlines” and his security clearance to aid him in his role in the 
conspiracy.  App. 411.  The District Court concluded that 
Douglas’ total offense level was 43, which is the maximum 
under the Guidelines and corresponds to a sentence of life 
imprisonment.  The District Court ultimately decided to vary 
downward from the Guidelines recommendation and imposed 
a sentence of 240 months.   
 
 On appeal, a Panel of this Court affirmed Douglas’s 
sentence with respect to the drug quantity calculation and the 
enhancement for abuse of a position of public or private trust, 
but it reversed the obstruction of justice enhancement.  The full 
Court subsequently granted Douglas’s petition for rehearing en 
banc solely on the issue of whether he was subject to the 
enhancement for abuse of a position of trust.1 
                                                 
 1 The order granting rehearing en banc vacated the 
original panel opinion in its entirety, but the full Court did not 
rehear the drug quantity calculation or obstruction of justice 
enhancement issues.  The Panel has issued a new opinion that 
reinstates the original Panel opinion except for the issue 
addressed here.  That new Panel opinion is filed 
contemporaneously with this en banc opinion.  See United 
States v. Douglas, No. 15-1754, --- F.3d --- (3d Cir. ____).   
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II. JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  Whether a defendant 
occupied a position of public or private trust for purposes of 
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 is a legal question over which we exercise 
plenary review.  United States v. DeMuro, 677 F.3d 550, 567 
(3d Cir. 2012).  If we determine the defendant held such a 
position, we review for clear error whether he abused the 
position.  Id.   
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
 In relevant part, U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 states: “If the 
defendant abused a position of public or private trust . . . in a 
manner that significantly facilitated the commission or 
concealment of the offense, increase by 2 levels.”  Application 
Note 1 to the Guideline adds that a “position of public or 
private trust” is “characterized by professional or managerial 
discretion (i.e., substantial discretionary judgment that is 
ordinarily given considerable deference).  Persons holding 
such positions ordinarily are subject to significantly less 
supervision than employees whose responsibilities are 
primarily non-discretionary in nature.”  U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 cmt. 
n.1.  Note 1 also provides three examples of when the two-level 
enhancement would apply: “the case of an embezzlement of a 
client’s funds by an attorney serving as a guardian, a bank 
executive’s fraudulent loan scheme, [and] the criminal sexual 
abuse of a patient by a physician under the guise of an 
examination.”  Id.  The Note further states that the 
enhancement would “not apply in the case of an embezzlement 
or theft by an ordinary bank teller or hotel clerk.”  Id.   
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 Application Note 2 to the Guideline likewise reinforces 
the requirement of discretionary judgment by identifying two 
exceptions when the enhancement would apply even in the 
absence of such judgment: cases in which a postal worker 
“engages in the theft or destruction of undelivered United 
States mail,” and cases in which a defendant abuses “the 
authority of his or her position in order to obtain, transfer, or 
issue unlawfully, or without authority, any means of 
identification,” as when a hospital orderly misappropriates 
information from a patient’s chart.  Id. cmt. n.2.   
 
A. The Shortcomings of Our Approach to Cases 
 Involving the § 3B1.3 Enhancement 
 
 In determining whether a defendant is subject to the 
§ 3B1.3 enhancement for abuse of a position of public or 
private trust, our precedent calls for a two-part inquiry.  First, 
we must determine whether the defendant actually occupied a 
position of public or private trust.  E.g., United States v. 
Iannone, 184 F.3d 214, 222 (3d Cir. 1999).  Second, if we 
conclude that the defendant did hold such a position, then we 
“must determine whether the defendant abused this position in 
a manner that significantly facilitated his crime.”  Id.  
Separately, we have held that, when determining at step one 
whether the defendant occupied a position of public or private 
trust, courts are to “consider: (1) whether the position allows 
the defendant to commit a difficult-to-detect wrong; (2) the 
degree of authority which the position vests in defendant vis-
à-vis the object of the wrongful act; and (3) whether there has 
been reliance on the integrity of the person occupying the 
position.”  United States v. Pardo, 25 F.3d 1187, 1192 (3d Cir. 
1994).   
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 For the last two decades, we have followed this 
approach in a number of cases, most of which have involved 
instances where the defendant had been convicted of some kind 
of fraud.  See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 554 F.3d 415, 
425 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Thomas, 315 F.3d 190, 
204–05 (3d Cir. 2002), abrogated on other grounds by 
Loughrin v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2384 (2014); United 
States v. Sokolow, 91 F.3d 396, 412–13 (3d Cir. 1996).   
 
 Our application of this framework has not been entirely 
uncontroversial, however.  In 1999, in his concurrence in 
Iannone, then-Chief Judge Becker discussed two related 
problems with our focus on the three factors we identified in 
Pardo.  First, according to him, the Pardo factors were “better 
at detecting abuses of trust . . . than defining a true ‘position’ 
of trust.”  Iannone, 184 F.3d at 233 (Becker, C.J., concurring).  
In other words, Chief Judge Becker wrote, “the use of the 
[Pardo] tripartite test dilutes the concept of a ‘position’ of trust, 
reducing our inquiry in practical terms to whether there was an 
‘abuse of trust.’”  Id. at 234.  And second, because fraud 
inherently involves an abuse of trust, the emphasis on the 
Pardo factors meant that the § 3B1.3 enhancement would 
apply in virtually every fraud case.  Id.  As Chief Judge Becker 
explained, “[b]ecause fraud normally includes all three factors, 
our description of abuse of trust works equally well as a 
description of fraud.”  Id. at 232.   
 
 To date, this Court has not acted on Chief Judge 
Becker’s concerns.  But upon examination, we find merit in the 
issues he recognized, and we also see additional problems with 
the Pardo factors’ place in our analysis.  As a result, we are 
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convinced that our approach to cases involving the § 3B1.3 
enhancement now requires refinement.   
 
 We come to this conclusion for three reasons.   
 
 First, our use of the Pardo factors has conflated the two 
distinct parts of the § 3B1.3 inquiry.  We have made clear that 
courts must first determine whether the defendant held a 
position of trust before examining whether he abused that 
position in a manner that facilitated the commission or 
concealment of his crime.  See, e.g., Iannone, 184 F.3d at 222.  
The first question directs the court’s attention to the 
defendant’s status, and the second focuses on the defendant’s 
conduct.   
 
 Yet the Pardo factors, while purportedly aimed at 
resolving the first question, instead speak to the second.  They 
demonstrate how the defendant’s position enabled his conduct.  
The first factor—the freedom to commit a difficult-to-detect 
wrong—is relevant to whether the defendant was able to 
“commi[t] or conceal[] . . . the offense,” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, but 
it says little about whether he occupied a position of public or 
private trust in the first place.  The second factor leads to the 
same problem: by asking whether the defendant had authority 
vis-à-vis the object of the wrongful act, we inevitably end up 
looking at the nature of the crime committed, rather than first 
examining the defendant’s position.  The third factor—whether 
there has been any reliance on the defendant’s integrity—is 
relevant to the extent it shows that the defendant was 
unsupervised or given considerable deference.  However, 
factor three leads courts astray when it shifts the focus to the 
victim’s susceptibility or the actions of some third party, 
12 
 
because that evidence may have nothing to do with the 
defendant’s position.   
 
 Thus, the Pardo factors, taken together, “dilute[] the 
concept of a ‘position’ of trust, reducing our inquiry in 
practical terms to whether there was an ‘abuse of trust.’”  
Iannone, 184 F.3d at 234 (Becker, C.J., concurring).  Section 
3B1.3 does not apply to all abuses of trust, however.  The clear 
text of the Guideline states that only defendants who held a 
position of trust are subject to the enhancement.   
 
 The second reason our approach requires refinement is 
that our use of the Pardo factors is rooted in an outdated 
version of the commentary to § 3B1.3.  Amended Guidelines 
commentary is binding on federal courts and supersedes prior 
judicial interpretations of the Guidelines.  See Stinson v. United 
States, 508 U.S. 36, 46 (1993); United States v. Keller, 666 
F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2011).  Relevant here is a 1993 
amendment to § 3B1.3, Application Note 1, which added the 
language referring to “professional or managerial discretion” 
and “considerable deference,” as well as the three examples of 
positions subject to the enhancement.  Prior to the amendment, 
the Note stated, in its entirety, only that “The position of trust 
must have contributed in some substantial way to facilitating 
the crime and not merely provided an opportunity that could as 
easily have been afforded to other persons.  This adjustment, 
for example, would not apply to an embezzlement by an 
ordinary bank teller.”  U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 note (Historical Notes, 
1993 Amendments).   
 
 In Pardo, the Court acknowledged the amendment, but 
it applied the pre-1993 version of the Note because the conduct 
at issue had taken place prior to the amendment.  25 F.3d at 
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1190.  And the Court developed the three Pardo factors based 
on a “[c]ulling” of pre-1993 case law.  Id. at 1192.  As a result, 
Pardo does not direct courts to the indicia provided in the 
amended Application Note 1.  The ability to commit a difficult-
to-detect wrong—which Pardo deemed “the primary trait that 
distinguishes a person in a position of trust from one who is 
not,” 25 F.3d at 1191 (quoting United States v. Lieberman, 971 
F.2d 989, 993 (3d Cir. 1992))—says nothing about whether the 
defendant exercised discretion by virtue of his position, much 
less professional or managerial discretion.  Nor does it speak 
to whether the defendant’s status engendered considerable 
deference.  The significance of the 1993 amendment to Note 1 
has led other circuits to conclude that pre-1993 case law is now 
of little use in determining whether a defendant held a position 
of trust.  See, e.g., United States v. Reccko, 151 F.3d 29, 33 (1st 
Cir. 1998) (“It is true that in dealing with the position-of-trust 
enhancement courts occasionally have emphasized the 
employee’s freedom to commit wrongs that defy facile 
detection . . . .  But these decisions deal with earlier versions of 
§ 3B1.3 and, thus, antedate the Sentencing Commission’s 
emphasis on managerial or professional discretion.” (citation 
omitted)); United States v. Jankowski, 194 F.3d 878, 884 n.5 
(8th Cir. 1999) (“[M]uch of the pre-1993 caselaw on section 
3B1.3 is not particularly helpful to us.”).  By using the Pardo 
factors to guide our determination of whether the defendant 
occupied a position of trust, we have failed to give proper effect 
to the current version of the commentary and its emphasis on 
professional or managerial discretion.   
 
 Finally, the third reason our approach requires 
refinement is that, in practice, our use of the Pardo factors has 
placed few limits on the scope of the § 3B1.3 enhancement.  
Because of Pardo’s emphasis on the ability to commit a 
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difficult-to-detect wrong and authority vis-à-vis the object of 
the wrong, mere physical access becomes sufficient.  It is 
therefore difficult to imagine a government employee who 
would not be subject to the enhancement.  The enhancement 
would seemingly apply, for example, to a custodian at a 
government office building who stole something off of the 
desk of another government employee.  The custodian would 
likely have keys to every room in the building—i.e., the 
authority vis-à-vis the object of the crime—and that access 
would enable him to bypass security measures and commit a 
difficult-to-detect wrong.  For similar reasons, “ordinary bank 
teller[s]” would likely qualify for the enhancement under 
Pardo too, if they were not already specifically exempted by 
Application Note 1.  It is evident, however, that the Sentencing 
Commission did not intend for the enhancement to apply this 
broadly.  Our approach to cases involving § 3B1.3 must 
distinguish between those positions that are characterized by 
professional or managerial discretion and those that are not.   
 
B. A Refined, Discretion-Focused Approach 
 
 Resolving these issues does not require a wholesale 
abandonment of our approach to cases involving the § 3B1.3 
enhancement.  We see no reason to alter the basic structure of 
our two-part inquiry, because the text of § 3B1.3 requires both 
that the defendant hold a “position of public or private trust” 
and that he “abuse[]” it “in a manner that significantly 
facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense.”2 
                                                 
 2 Other circuits have also adopted similar two-part 
inquiries.  See, e.g., United States v. Reccko, 151 F.3d 29, 31 
(1st Cir. 1998); United States v. Ollison, 555 F.3d 152, 165–66 
(5th Cir. 2009); United States v. DeMarco, 784 F.3d 388, 397 
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 A change is required, however, to the way we use the 
three Pardo factors.  Accordingly, we will no longer look to 
those factors when answering the preliminary, status-focused 
question of whether a defendant held a position of public or 
private trust.  Instead, when determining if the defendant 
occupied a position of trust, we will ask whether the defendant 
had the power to make decisions substantially free from 
supervision based on (1) a fiduciary or fiduciary-like 
relationship, or (2) an authoritative status that would lead his 
actions or judgment to be presumptively accepted.3  In 
answering this question, we will not consider the context of the 
crime committed, because, as explained above, the text of the 
Guideline requires that we first determine whether the 
defendant held a position that qualifies for the enhancement.  
                                                 
(7th Cir. 2015); United States v. Aubrey, 800 F.3d 1115, 1134 
(9th Cir. 2015); United States v. Merriman, 647 F.3d 1002, 
1005 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Walker, 490 F.3d 1282, 
1300 (11th Cir. 2007).   
 3 Judge Shwartz’s dissenting opinion expresses concern 
over the § 3B1.3 enhancement being limited to situations 
where a fiduciary relationship existed.  It therefore bears 
emphasis that our definition of a position of trust is disjunctive, 
and a fiduciary relationship is not required for the enhancement 
to apply.  Nor does our definition encompass only defendants 
holding professional or managerial titles.  Although the 
defendant’s job title may be relevant to the inquiry, it is not 
dispositive.    
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The defendant’s crime is not relevant to the status-focused 
inquiry.4   
 
 In addition to being consistent with the text of the 
Guideline, this conception of a position of trust also comports 
with the text of Application Note 1 and its instruction that 
positions of trust are “characterized by professional or 
managerial discretion (i.e., substantial discretionary judgment 
that is ordinarily given considerable deference).  Persons 
holding such positions ordinarily are subject to significantly 
less supervision than employees whose responsibilities are 
primarily non-discretionary in nature.”  U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 cmt. 
n.1.   
 
 The conception aligns, as well, with the specific 
examples listed in Application Note 1.  The Note states that the 
enhancement would apply to “an embezzlement of a client’s 
                                                 
 4 Our conception of a position of trust is similar, though 
not identical, to that articulated by other circuits.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Tiojanco, 286 F.3d 1019, 1021 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(Positions of trust “involve the type of complex, situation-
specific decisionmaking that is given considerable deference 
precisely because it cannot be dictated entirely by, or 
monitored against, established protocol.”); United States v. 
Young, 266 F.3d 468, 475 (6th Cir. 2001) (“A position of trust 
is marked by substantial managerial discretion and fiduciary-
like responsibilities—a position with supervisory authority and 
one which engenders considerable deference.”).  Other circuits 
have also more broadly emphasized the concepts of discretion, 
deference, and authority.  See, e.g., Aubrey, 800 F.3d at 1134; 
Reccko, 151 F.3d at 34. 
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funds by an attorney serving as a guardian, a bank executive’s 
fraudulent loan scheme, or the criminal sexual abuse of a 
patient by a physician under the guise of an examination.”  
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1.  The first two examples fall into the 
category of individuals with the power to make decisions free 
from supervision based on a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary 
relationship, while the physician holds an authoritative status 
such that his or her actions or judgment would be 
presumptively accepted.  Application Note 1 further states that 
the enhancement would not apply “in the case of an 
embezzlement or theft by an ordinary bank teller or hotel 
clerk.”  Id.  Neither of those positions fall within the scope of 
the definition we now adopt.5 
                                                 
 5 Notwithstanding the problems with our past use of 
Pardo, the approach we now adopt is also largely reconcilable 
with our post-1993 precedent.  Several of those cases involve 
applying the enhancement to fraud committed by a defendant 
abusing a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relationship.  See, e.g., 
Kennedy, 554 F.3d at 417–18, 425; Thomas, 315 F.3d at 193–
94, 205; United States v. Hart, 273 F.3d 363, 377–79 (3d Cir. 
2001); Iannone, 184 F.3d at 217–19, 225; United States v. 
Bennett, 161 F.3d 171, 174–75, 194–96 (3d Cir. 1998); 
Sokolow, 91 F.3d at 400–01, 413.  In three other cases, we 
found subject to the enhancement defendants in particular 
positions of authority whose judgment would be presumptively 
accepted.  See United States v. Babaria, 775 F.3d 593, 595–98 
(3d Cir. 2014) (physician); United States v. Dullum, 560 F.3d 
133, 135–37, 140–41 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2009) (Secret Service 
agent who also served in senior leadership position at his 
church); United States v. Sherman, 160 F.3d 967, 969–70 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (physician).   
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 Only if we find that a defendant occupied a position of 
trust will we proceed to the second part of the inquiry and ask 
whether the position significantly facilitated the commission or 
concealment of the crime.  The Pardo factors—although not 
relevant to the position question—are relevant here, because 
they speak to how the defendant’s position enabled his 
conduct.  Thus, in making this determination, courts should 
consider, among other things, whether the defendant’s position 
allowed him to commit a difficult-to-detect wrong, and the 
defendant’s authority vis-à-vis the object of the wrongful act.  
Courts may also consider whether the victim relied on the 
defendant’s integrity, such that the victim became a more 
susceptible target for the defendant.6  Courts need not find all 
of the Pardo factors satisfied before concluding that the 
enhancement applies.  At the same time, however, courts 
should not impose the enhancement if the defendant’s status 
provided merely some assistance.  The text of the Guideline 
makes clear that the defendant must abuse his position in a 
manner that significantly facilitated the commission or 
concealment of the offense.7   
                                                 
 6 Other factors may be relevant as well; we need not 
provide an exhaustive list. 
 7 Contrary to the assertions of Judge Shwartz’s 
dissenting opinion, we do not hold that courts should disregard 
“the context in which the defendant’s actions took place” when 
deciding whether to apply the § 3B1.3 enhancement.  
Dissenting Op. (Shwartz, J.) at 1.  This second part of the 
inquiry in fact requires courts to consider the context in which 
the defendant’s actions took place.   
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C. Douglas’s Case 
 
 Turning to the facts of Douglas’s case, we conclude that 
he did not occupy a position of public or private trust for 
purposes of § 3B1.3.  Absent from the record is any evidence 
that Douglas’s job as an airline mechanic for United Airlines 
falls within either of the categories of positions of trust we have 
identified.  With regard to the first category, we have no reason 
to believe that Douglas had the power to make decisions 
substantially free from supervision based on a fiduciary or 
fiduciary-like obligation to the airline, airport, or public.  
Douglas was not required to place any third party’s interests 
above his own, nor did he imply that he would do so.  Douglas 
may have had certain privileges within the airport, but if he 
possessed any decisionmaking authority whatsoever, it is not 
apparent that it extended to someone or something other than 
himself.  And even if Douglas did possess the requisite 
decisionmaking authority, the record simply does not show that 
he exercised it free from supervision.   
 
 Similarly, Douglas’s position as a mechanic does not 
qualify as an authoritative status that would lead his actions or 
                                                 
 At the same time, our holding that the defendant’s crime 
is irrelevant to the initial status-focused inquiry does not mean 
that the enhancement is limited to situations where the 
defendant was “task[ed] . . . with preventing the type of wrong 
that he committed.”  Dissenting Op. (Shwartz, J.) at 10 n.7.  No 
such nexus is required for the defendant to have abused his 
position in a manner that significantly facilitated the 
commission or concealment of the offense.   
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judgment to be presumptively accepted.  The record does not 
establish that Douglas’s job required him to exercise any 
judgment, much less judgment that others accepted.  Indeed, 
Douglas’s position was not the product of particularly unique 
abilities or experience that would cause others to defer to him, 
as they ordinarily would a doctor or a police officer.  As best 
we can tell, Douglas was an ordinary line mechanic.  Without 
some evidence that his position was characterized by 
professional or managerial discretion, we are unable to 
conclude that the § 3B1.3 enhancement applies.8 
 
 The Government argues that Douglas is subject to the 
enhancement because he had been granted a security clearance 
and an AOA badge, allowing him to move freely through the 
airport.  This may demonstrate that the airline and the TSA 
trusted Douglas, but it does not show that he held a position of 
trust, as defined by the Guideline.  The mere fact that someone 
trusted the defendant does not satisfy the Guideline’s 
definition.  Rather, as we have explained, § 3B1.3 requires 
professional or managerial discretion.  Other courts have 
therefore termed “position of public or private trust,” as used 
in § 3B1.3, “a term of art, appropriating some of the aspects of 
the legal concept of a trustee or fiduciary.”  United States v. 
                                                 
 8 This conclusion is consistent with that reached by the 
First Circuit, which has twice held that airport employees able 
to bypass security measures do not, by that fact alone, hold 
positions of trust for purposes of § 3B1.3.  See United States v. 
Correy, 570 F.3d 373, 395 (1st Cir. 2009) (airport janitor who 
helped smuggle drugs); United States v. Parrilla Román, 485 
F.3d 185, 190–92 (1st Cir. 2007) (airport baggage handlers 
who helped smuggle drugs).   
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Morris, 286 F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting United 
States v. Garrison, 133 F.3d 831, 839 n.18 (11th Cir. 1998)); 
see also United States v. Ragland, 72 F.3d 500, 502–03 (6th 
Cir. 1996).   
 
 In this case, Douglas “may have occupied a position of 
trust in the colloquial sense that [he] was trusted not to use [his] 
access for nefarious purposes,” but physical access, on its own, 
does not amount to professional or managerial discretion.  
United States v. Tann, 532 F.3d 868, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2008).9  On 
                                                 
 9 In arguing that Douglas’s unique physical access to the 
airport should be sufficient to subject him to the § 3B1.3 
enhancement, Judge Shwartz’s dissenting opinion relies 
heavily on three cases in which other circuits “applied the . . . 
enhancement to prison workers who abuse[d] positions that 
gave them special access to highly secure and regulated 
locations.”  Dissenting Op. (Shwartz, J.) at 9–10 (citing United 
States v. Gilliam, 315 F.3d 614, 618 (6th Cir. 2003); United 
States v. Brown, 7 F.3d 1155, 1162 (5th Cir. 1993); and United 
States v. Armstrong, 992 F.2d 171, 172–73 (8th Cir. 1993)).  
Two of the cases cited, however, involved conduct predating 
the 1993 amendment to Application Note 1 and therefore 
contained no discussion of professional or managerial 
discretion.  See Brown, 7 F.3d at 1161; Armstrong, 992 F.2d at 
173–74.  The third case involved a defendant who did not 
actually work in a prison, but instead was an alcohol and drug 
counselor to individuals on federal probation supervision.  See 
Gilliam, 315 F.3d at 616.  The application of the enhancement 
there could not have turned on any special, physical access 
granted to the defendant, because he in fact possessed no such 
access.   
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the contrary, Application Note 2 makes clear that § 3B1.3 
applies in only two situations where the defendant did not 
exercise such discretion and was trusted solely with physical 
access: theft of mail by postal workers and identity theft.  
Notably, the Sentencing Commission has not expanded this 
exception to the general rule beyond those two categories, 
despite amending the commentary several times since 1993, 
including most recently in 2009, and despite the heightened 
security at airports over that timeframe and the corresponding 
trust inherent in granting physical access to airport 
employees.10  Thus, in the absence of further action from the 
Commission, the Government must show that Douglas 
possessed more than just the right to be somewhere.   
 
 The Government also contends that we can infer 
Douglas enjoyed a degree of authority and autonomy from the 
fact he was able to smuggle cocaine into the airport over forty 
times without being caught.  This logic, however, “turns the 
guideline on its head: it does not follow that, merely because a 
defendant’s position enables him to commit an offense, the 
position must have been unsupervised and, thus, a position of 
trust.”  United States v. Parrilla Román, 485 F.3d 185, 191 (1st 
Cir. 2007).  The Government also bears the burden of 
establishing that the enhancement applies.  United States v. 
Napolitan, 762 F.3d 297, 309 (3d Cir. 2014).  That burden is 
                                                 
 10 The heightened risks associated with physical access 
to airports and other public facilities are addressed in part by 
§ 5K2.14 of the Guidelines, which provides for an upward 
departure where “national security, public health, or safety” 
has been “significantly endangered” by a defendant’s conduct.  
U.S.S.G. § 5K2.14.   
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not met when the Government simply reiterates evidence of the 
defendant’s ability to commit the underlying crime.  Here, the 
Government has shown only that Douglas’s access to the 
airport terminal helped him commit the offense.  It has not 
demonstrated that Douglas’s position at the airport was 
characterized by professional or managerial discretion.11  
Accordingly, there is no need to proceed to the second part of 
the inquiry and determine whether Douglas abused his position 
in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or 
concealment of his crime.  We hold that he did not occupy a 
position of public or private trust for purposes of U.S.S.G. 
§ 3B1.3.   
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s imposition of the two-level enhancement under 
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, and remand for resentencing.   
                                                 
 11 We recognize that we have refined our approach to 
cases involving § 3B1.3 in this opinion and that the 
Government did not have the benefit of knowing that approach 
when it sought the enhancement before the District Court and 
on appeal.  Nonetheless, the Government has had ample 
opportunity to develop the record fully in this case, and it has 
not produced any evidence showing Douglas’s position was 
characterized by professional or managerial discretion.  Under 
such circumstances, we have no reservations in concluding that 
the Government has not met its burden of establishing that the 
enhancement applies.   
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
Because I agree with neither the Majority’s conclusion 
nor the path it took to get there, I must respectfully dissent. I 
write separately to reiterate my view that we should interpret 
the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) according to 
their plain language without adding extra-textual “tests.” 
 Based in part on a two-level enhancement for abuse of 
a position of trust under § 3B1.3 of the Guidelines, the District 
Court treated Douglas’s offense level as 43 because its initial 
calculation (44) was so high that it was literally “off the 
charts.” Douglas’s crime was so severe that, despite the fact 
that this was his first offense, the Guidelines suggested a 
sentence of life imprisonment. Had the District Court disagreed 
with the Probation Office’s recommendation that § 3B1.3 
applied to Douglas, his offense level would have been 42, 
yielding a Guidelines range of 360 months to life. 
As the Majority acknowledges, the District Court 
sentenced Douglas to 240 months in prison, which was a 
considerable downward variance. Is there any reason to believe 
that Douglas’s sentence would have been different had the 
District Court denied the enhancement and fixed Douglas’s 
Guidelines range at 360 months to life? I think not. After the 
initial sentencing proceeding, review by a panel of this Court, 
consideration of the appeal by the Court sitting en banc, and a 
second round of sentencing by the District Court, I expect the 
matter to end up right where it started: with a 240-month 
sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Zabielski, 711 F.3d 381, 
388–89 (3d Cir. 2013) (erroneous application of enhancement 
was harmless where “there [wa]s a high probability that it 
would have imposed the same sentence irrespective of the . . . 
enhancement”). 
2 
 
Although I am not convinced that the transcript of 
Douglas’s sentencing hearing reflects the same sort of 
“detailed findings of fact and explanation” that justified our 
application of the harmless-error doctrine in Zabielski, see id., 
it’s hard to imagine why the District Court would, after giving 
Douglas such a substantial downward variance, conclude on 
remand that an even greater variance is appropriate simply 
because Douglas did not exercise professional or managerial 
discretion. Regardless of whether Douglas was a “fiduciary,” a 
“professional,” or a “manager,” the fact remains that he had a 
security clearance that gave him special access to sensitive 
locations at an international airport, which he abused in order 
to facilitate large-scale drug trafficking to the great detriment 
of the public. In my view, this satisfies § 3B1.3. 
 Although I agree with the result she reaches, I cannot 
join Judge Shwartz’s thoughtful dissent because I do not agree 
that the factors we established in United States v. Pardo, 25 
F.3d 1187 (3d Cir. 1994), are worth retaining. Hearing this case 
en banc gave us an opportunity to scuttle this test, which strays 
far from the text of § 3B1.3. Compare USSG § 3B1.3 
(enhancement applies “[i]f the defendant abused a position of 
public or private trust . . . in a manner that significantly 
facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense”), 
with Pardo, 25 F.3d at 1192 (“[c]ulling . . . from our cases” the 
following factors: “(1) whether the position allows the 
defendant to commit a difficult-to-detect wrong; (2) the degree 
of authority which the position vests in defendant vis-a-vis the 
object of the wrongful act; and (3) whether there has been 
reliance on the integrity of the person occupying the position,” 
to be “considered in light of the guiding rationale of the 
section—to punish ‘insiders’ who abuse their positions rather 
than those who take advantage of an available opportunity”). 
3 
 
 In seeking to refine the Pardo test, the Majority adds 
even more extra-textual requirements to what was already an 
unnecessarily prolix framework. This new iteration divides the 
§ 3B1.3 inquiry into a “preliminary, status-focused question of 
whether a defendant held a position of public or private trust,” 
which then “ask[s] whether the defendant had the power to 
make decisions substantially free from supervision based on 
(1) a fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationship, or (2) an 
authoritative status that would lead his actions or judgment to 
be presumptively accepted.” Id. at 14–15. If this new set of 
prerequisites is satisfied, it is then capped off by a Pardo 
analysis, which requires an examination of how the crime was 
committed. I recommend we eschew this schema in favor of 
one relevant question: did the District Court err in concluding 
that Douglas abused a position of public trust? See USSG 
§ 3B1.3. 
 I agree with the Majority that the Guidelines 
commentary is entitled to “controlling weight.” Stinson v. 
United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993) (quoting 
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 
(1945)). But Judge Shwartz is correct that the relevant 
application note, which explains that a position of trust is 
“characterized by professional or managerial discretion (i.e., 
substantial discretionary judgment that is ordinarily given 
considerable deference),” does not foreclose the application of 
the § 3B1.3 enhancement to Douglas even though he did not 
exercise the discretion of a “manager” or “professional.” 
Shwartz Dissent at 1 (quoting USSG § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1). The 
phrase “characterized by,” along with the use of “i.e.,” 
confirms that such discretion is merely “typical or 
characteristic of” a position of trust rather than a necessary 
component. See Characterize 2, Oxford English Dictionary 
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(2017); see, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 315 F.3d 190, 204 
(3d Cir. 2002) (applying § 3B1.3 enhancement to a non-
manager), abrogated on other grounds by Loughrin v. United 
States, 134 S. Ct. 2384 (2014). In light of his ability to bypass 
airport security and go “almost everywhere” in and around 
sensitive areas of the terminal during his overnight shift, 
App. 140–42, Douglas was hardly an “ordinary bank teller or 
hotel clerk.” USSG § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1. 
 In sum, I would discard the Pardo test and review the 
District Court’s analysis by applying the text of § 3B1.3, as 
informed by its application notes, without further 
embellishments. Accordingly, I would affirm the District 
Court’s judgment sentencing Douglas to 240 months’ 
imprisonment, not only because its application of the § 3B1.3 
enhancement was legally sound, but also because the absence 
of that enhancement—which would have yielded an advisory 
Guidelines range of 360 months to life—should not affect what 
was already a very substantial downward variance.  
Despite the additional discretion the Supreme Court 
granted to district judges in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 
220 (2005), our sentencing review has become increasingly 
formalistic: the district court applies an enhancement, the 
defendant appeals on procedural reasonableness grounds, and 
this Court spills much ink exploring the finer points of the 
enhancement instead of evaluating the more meaningful 
sentencing factors stated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). I fear that we 
are losing the forest for the trees—and this case is a prime 
example of the problem. With respect, I dissent. 
1 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge, dissenting with whom 
CHAGARES and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges, join. 
 
 Our colleagues have concluded that our long-standing 
test for applying the enhancement for abuse of a position of 
trust under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 set forth in United States v. 
Pardo, 25 F.3d 1187 (3d Cir. 1994), should be changed and 
that, in considering whether to apply the enhancement, courts 
should not take into account the context in which the 
defendant’s actions took place.  We disagree.  As explained 
below, the text of the Guideline and its application notes 
support considering the context of the defendant’s actions in 
determining whether he occupied a position of trust and abused 
it.  The Pardo test, which tracked the Guideline, appropriately 
allowed sentencing courts to consider context and should not 
be disturbed. 
 
I 
 
 Section 3B1.3 calls for a two-level enhancement of a 
defendant’s sentence “[i]f the defendant abused a position of 
public or private trust . . . in a manner that significantly 
facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense.”  The 
application note to § 3B1.3 states that positions of trust are 
“characterized by professional or managerial discretion (i.e., 
substantial discretionary judgment that is ordinarily given 
considerable deference) . . . [and are occupied by persons who] 
ordinarily are subject to significantly less supervision than 
employees whose responsibilities are primarily non-
discretionary in nature.”1  § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1.  The use of the 
                                                                
 1 The full note provides: 
 
2 
word “characterized” in describing “managerial or 
professional discretion” demonstrates that the enhancement is 
not limited to defendants who hold a professional or 
managerial job title.  See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 315 
F.3d 190, 204 (3d Cir. 2002) (home health aide, who opened 
the victim’s mail and paid bills for her, held a position of trust 
because “[t]hese tasks clearly invested [the aide] with 
                                                                
“Public or private trust” refers to a position of 
public or private trust characterized by 
professional or managerial discretion (i.e., 
substantial discretionary judgment that is 
ordinarily given considerable deference).  
Persons holding such positions ordinarily are 
subject to significantly less supervision than 
employees whose responsibilities are primarily 
non-discretionary in nature.  For this adjustment 
to apply, the position of public or private trust 
must have contributed in some significant way to 
facilitating the commission or concealment of 
the offense (e.g., by making the detection of the 
offense or the defendant’s responsibility for the 
offense more difficult).  This adjustment, for 
example, applies in the case of an embezzlement 
of a client’s funds by an attorney serving as a 
guardian, a bank executive’s fraudulent loan 
scheme, or the criminal sexual abuse of a patient 
by a physician under the guise of an examination.  
This adjustment does not apply in the case of an 
embezzlement or theft by an ordinary bank teller 
or hotel clerk because such positions are not 
characterized by the above-described factors. 
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1.   
3 
considerable discretion since [the victim] did not monitor [her] 
closely and appeared to rely on her judgment and integrity”), 
abrogated on other grounds by Loughrin v. United States, 134 
S. Ct. 2384 (2014).  Moreover, by using the signal “i.e.” (which 
means “that is,” Merriam-Webster Dictionary, available at 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/i.e.), the 
Commission is directing courts to focus on whether the 
discretion the person has is ordinarily given significant 
deference and whether the person is ordinarily subject to less 
supervision.  Furthermore, while a defendant who is a fiduciary 
or who holds fiduciary-like status may qualify for the 
enhancement, fiduciary status is not required.  In fact, in 
describing when the adjustment applies, the Commission 
identified, “for example,” the following situations: an attorney 
serving as a guardian who embezzles client funds, a bank 
executive who perpetrates a fraudulent loan scheme, and a 
doctor who sexually abuses a patient “under the guise of an 
examination.”  U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1.  By using the words 
“for example,” the Commission informs us that there could be 
positions to which the enhancement applies where the holder 
of the position has discretion but is not a fiduciary.2    
                                                                
2 Other language in the Guideline and its application 
notes show that § 3B1.3 is not limited to defendants who are 
fiduciaries or hold fiduciary-like positions or who hold 
positions of authority.  For instance, Application Note 2, 
entitled “Application of Adjustment in Certain 
Circumstances,” mentions persons who hold positions that 
could impact the public at large, namely postal employees who 
steal or destroy United States mail and individuals who have 
access to personal identifying information, such as state motor 
vehicle department employees who are authorized to issue 
driver’s licenses.  Neither is a fiduciary and neither holds a 
4 
 Notably absent from the Guidelines and the 
commentary is guidance concerning the meaning of the phrase 
“position of public trust.”  The word “public” has several 
meanings, including “of or relating to people in general,” 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, available at 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/public, and the 
word “trust” in this context refers to “one in which confidence 
is placed,” id., available at https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/trust.  Applying the dictionary 
definitions, “position of public trust” under § 3B1.3 means a 
position in which people in general have placed confidence.  
The public expects those holding such positions to act in the 
public’s interest.3   
                                                                
position of authority.  Rather, each is an individual who has 
access to something the public entrusted to them.  While this 
note directs that the enhancement must apply in these 
situations, it is clear from later application notes that this note 
is not a limitation.  For example, in Application Note 5, the 
Commission identified “additional illustrations” in which the 
enhancement applies, such as the union context.  This reflects 
that the application notes provide examples that are not 
exhaustive. 
3 Section 3B1.3’s Application Note 2 provides two 
examples that fit this definition.  Each person described in the 
note is one in whom the public has placed confidence based 
upon their access to something valuable, such as an 
individual’s mail, personal identifying information, or a 
government-issued identification.  In addition, these 
individuals have discretion concerning how they perform their 
duties within the confines of some regulation, statute, or code 
of conduct.  Such rules and guidelines seek to ensure that these 
individuals do not misuse the authority they have been given 
5 
 Case law also recognizes that it is proper to consider the 
public’s expectations of a particular position when evaluating 
whether the enhancement applies.  For example, the public 
expects a health care provider who submits a claim to Medicare 
to provide truthful claims for reimbursement from government 
funds, see, e.g., United States v. Babaria, 775 F.3d 593, 596-
97 (3d Cir. 2014), a pharmacy intern to appropriately handle 
medications, United States v. Agyekum, 846 F.3d 744, 753-54 
(4th Cir. 2017), a deputy marshal not to misuse his ability to 
avoid searches so he can transfer a firearm to a felon, a police 
officer not to use drug-buy money for his own gain, United 
States v. Brann, 990 F.2d 98, 103 (3d Cir. 1993), and water 
district employees not to submit false documents regarding 
water quality, United States v. Kuhn, 345 F.3d 431, 436-37 
(6th Cir. 2003); United States v. White, 270 F.3d 356, 371-73 
(6th Cir. 2001).  In each instance, the public’s expectations of 
how these individuals should act stem from a code of conduct, 
ordinances, oaths, regulations, and statutes that govern their 
conduct given the jobs they hold or the places where they work 
and inform whether they hold positions of public trust. 
 
 The same applies to an individual who works at an 
airport.  Airport security in the United States is run by the 
Transportation Security Administration (the “TSA”), a 
government entity created in the aftermath of the September 11 
                                                                
and meet what the public expects of them.  For the letter carrier, 
the public expects that the mail entrusted to him or her will be 
kept safe and delivered to the intended destination.  For the 
DMV employee, the public expects that the employee will 
neither misuse the personal information to which he has access 
nor issue a valuable government identification to someone not 
entitled to it. 
6 
terrorist attacks to secure our airports and air travel.  
Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189, 206 (3d Cir. 2017).  
The TSA addresses security in many ways, including by 
ensuring that anyone who works at an airport undergoes 
criminal and intelligence background checks and receives 
training in airport security.4  Only those individuals who 
receive security clearance and complete the security training 
are given access to secured areas of the airport.5  In addition, 
                                                                
 4 See 49 C.F.R. § 1540.205(b), (d) (explaining that the 
TSA performs an “intelligence-related check” and, if an 
applicant “meets the security threat assessment standards,” 
then the “TSA serves a Determination of No Security Threat 
on the applicant”); id. § 1542.213(c) (stating that an “airport 
operator may not authorize any individual unescorted access to 
the [Airport Operation Authority] AOA . . . unless that 
individual has been provided” various forms of training, 
including in “[s]ecurity responsibilities”); id. § 1544.228(a), 
(b) (providing that any individual who, among other things, has 
unescorted access to cargo or performs certain functions 
related to the transportation of cargo “must successfully 
complete a security threat assessment”). 
 5 See 49 C.F.R. § 1540.5 (stating that “Secured Area 
means a portion of an airport . . . in which certain security 
measures specified in part 1542 of this chapter are carried out” 
and that “Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) means a 
portion of an airport . . . in which security measures specified 
in this part are carried out”); id. § 1540.105(a) (describing the 
“security responsibilities” of individuals with AOA access 
badges including the prohibition from the use of AOA access 
“in any other manner than that for which [the badge] was 
issued”); id. § 1542.203(b) (stating that “[e]ach airport 
operator required to establish an AOA must prevent and detect 
7 
the TSA checks the identification of and searches all 
passengers.  Areas that were formerly accessible to 
nontravelers, such as boarding areas, are now off-limits to all 
but those who have been through security or have security 
clearance.   
 
Airport security is considered a critical component of 
national security, and government authorities that grant access 
to secured areas expect those with access to act with integrity.  
Furthermore, the public trusts that airport employees will act 
in accordance with those systems and not use their positions to 
circumvent security measures to smuggle weapons or other 
contraband.  Indeed, the public cedes its judgment to those who 
are permitted in secured areas and is vulnerable to those who 
misuse their security clearance.  In this way, airports are unique 
given the Government’s implementation of robust and 
comprehensive security systems and the public’s expectation 
that those who work at airports will keep them safe.  Thus, an 
airport employee granted a security clearance is reasonably 
viewed as one who occupies a position of public trust that can 
be breached by using his or her position to further a crime.  See 
United States v. Higa, 55 F.3d 448, 453 (9th Cir. 1995) (leaving 
undisturbed the § 3B1.3 enhancement imposed on an airline 
customer service representative who “used his position with 
the airline to gain entry into areas where others could not” to 
smuggle drugs (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
                                                                
the unauthorized entry, presence, and movement of individuals 
and ground vehicles into or within the AOA by,” among other 
things, “[p]rovid[ing] security information . . . to each 
individual with unescorted access to the AOA”); id. 
§ 1542.205(a)(2) (providing that each area that is regularly 
used to load and unload cargo must be a SIDA).   
8 
Due to the critical importance of airport security and the 
public’s trust in those who have clearances, and considering 
the expansive nature of Douglas’s access to secured areas at an 
international airport, including the planes themselves, we 
cannot say that the District Court abused its discretion in 
concluding that Douglas held a position of public trust.  While 
the record does not indicate how closely Douglas was 
supervised while performing his mechanic duties, it is evident 
that he was vested with significant discretion.  Douglas’s 
receipt of an Airport Operation Authority (“AOA”) badge 
shows that the TSA and airport vested him with discretion to 
access areas of the airport in ways members of the public and 
other employees could not.  More specifically, Douglas had 
unfettered and unescorted access to planes, which the 
Government goes to great lengths to protect by screening every 
passenger who seeks to board and inspecting each bag placed 
within.  Like the pharmacist with access to controlled 
substances and the health provider who submits claims for 
payment from the United States Treasury, Douglas, as an 
airport employee with security clearance, was governed by a 
regulatory scheme imposed to protect the public.  The public, 
in turn, relies on people like Douglas not to misuse their special 
status.  In short, the context in which Douglas engaged in his 
criminal activity and the public’s expectations for how 
someone in his position should behave show that he occupied 
a position of trust.   
 
 Thus, Douglas held a position of trust because 
(a) national security and public safety concerns in the context 
in which he worked are paramount, (b) the Government has 
implemented significant security systems to address those 
concerns, (c) the public relies upon those security measures 
and trusts those with security clearances and the authority they 
9 
have been granted to act in a responsible fashion, and 
(d) Douglas was vested with authority to access secure 
locations at the airport.6    
 
 Concluding that an airport worker like Douglas holds a 
position of public trust finds support in cases that have held 
that prison workers hold positions of trust.  Both airports and 
prisons have governmentally-imposed security measures 
designed to keep the location secure and to protect the public.  
Prison employees are given authority to enter these secured 
places, and misuse of this access can pose a risk to public 
safety.  For these reasons, our sister circuits have applied the 
§ 3B1.3 enhancement to prison workers who abuse positions 
                                                                
 6 While issues of national security and public safety 
provide a basis for an upward departure under U.S.S.G. 
§ 5K2.14, that departure provision covers a concern that differs 
from that addressed by § 3B1.3.  Section 5K2.14 permits an 
upward departure “[i]f national security, public health, or 
safety was significantly endangered” as a result of the 
defendant’s conduct, regardless of where the conduct took 
place.  Thus, § 5K2.14 focuses on the consequences of the 
defendant’s actions.  Section 3B1.3 focuses on the position the 
defendant held and whether he abused it.  Cf. United States v. 
Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1118 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(acknowledging that the upward departures for conduct that 
endangers the public safety under § 5K2.14 and extreme 
conduct under § 5K2.8 may overlap but concluding that they 
address “analytically distinct” concepts, where the national 
security enhancement addresses the impact of the defendant’s 
dangerous conduct on “safety and welfare of the general 
public”), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Grier, 
449 F.3d 558, 570 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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that gave them special access to highly secure and regulated 
locations.  See United States v. Gilliam, 315 F.3d 614, 618 (6th 
Cir. 2003) (drug counselor used his position to engage in drug 
dealing with prisoners); United States v. Brown, 7 F.3d 1155, 
1162 (5th Cir. 1993) (prison food service manager who 
smuggled prisoners the proceeds of a Postal Service money 
order scheme); United States v. Armstrong, 992 F.2d 171, 172-
73 (8th Cir. 1993) (prison instructor who solicited inmates to 
manufacture and pass counterfeit bills).  This is because “the 
public places tremendous trust in prison employees that they 
will not conspire with inmates to violate the law.”  Gilliam, 315 
F.3d at 618 (alteration, citation, and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Similarly, the layers of security at airports 
“advance[] the public interest” in national security, United 
States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 179 (3d Cir. 2006); see also 
Singleton v. C.I.R., 606 F.2d 50, 52 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(recognizing the government’s “compelling reasons” for 
airport and airline security),7 and those who misuse their 
                                                                
7 That Douglas’s job did not task him with preventing 
the type of wrong that he committed does not undermine the 
conclusion that he was able to commit the crime as a result of 
the position of trust he held.  Like the prison employees who 
were not specifically tasked with preventing contraband from 
moving through the prisons, Douglas used his unfettered and 
unescorted access at the airport to surreptitiously move 
contraband and abuse his position of trust.  See Gilliam, 315 
F.3d at 618; Brown, 7 F.3d at 1162; Armstrong, 992 F.2d at 
172-74. 
Furthermore, although Douglas was a mechanic, this 
does not mean that he did not hold a position of public trust.  It 
is undeniable that he held a position of trust insofar as he was 
given access to aircraft engines and the public would trust him 
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secured access undermine that interest and violate the public 
trust.   
 
 For these reasons, the context in which Douglas 
committed his crime shows that he did so by abusing a position 
of public trust and he is subject to the enhancement. 
 
II 
 
 Aside from forbidding sentencing judges from 
considering context, the Majority chose to modify our decades-
old test, known as the Pardo test or Pardo factors, for applying 
the enhancement.  No party requested a rejection or even 
modification of Pardo, the Pardo test has not resulted in either 
an overuse or misuse of the enhancement, and most 
importantly, the test comports with the Sentencing Guidelines.  
Thus, no modification of Pardo is required. 
 
 
                                                                
not to use his position to tamper with the engines.  To limit the 
enhancement to situations only where the crime is at the 
heartland of his job duties as a mechanic, however, would 
enable him to avoid the enhancement where, for example, he 
entered a secured area and committed a different crime, such 
as slashing the plane’s tires.  In short, the applicability of the 
enhancement should be context-specific, rather job-specific.     
Moreover, the fact he may not hold a position of 
authority does not mean that he does not hold a position of 
trust.  A night watchman at a nuclear facility, who supervises 
no one, surely holds a position of trust because he is vested 
with tremendous responsibility to keep the facility secure to 
protect the public.    
12 
 Pursuant to Pardo,   
 
the inquiry into whether a defendant was 
appropriately subject to a § 3B1.3 enhancement 
is twofold.  First, the court must determine 
whether a defendant was placed in a position of 
trust, and, if he was, it must then determine 
whether he abused that position in a way that 
significantly facilitated his crime. 
 
In determining whether a position of trust exists, 
we consider three factors: (1) whether the 
position allows the defendant to commit a 
difficult-to-detect wrong; (2) the degree of 
authority to which the position vests in defendant 
vis-à-vis the object of the wrongful act; and 
(3) whether there has been reliance on the 
integrity of the person occupying the position. 
 
Babaria, 775 F.3d at 596 (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The Majority says that the Pardo test does not 
address whether a defendant holds a position of trust and does 
not track the components of § 3B1.3—discretion, deference, 
and supervision.  We disagree.  Pardo’s consideration of 
authority and the freedom to commit a difficult-to-detect 
wrong speaks to discretion and the presence or absence of 
supervision.  Pardo’s consideration of whether a person’s 
integrity is relied on speaks to whether his judgment is worthy 
of deference.  
 
 Moreover, the Pardo test ensures that sentencing courts 
apply the enhancement by considering the context within 
which the defendant acted and the expectations of those who 
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reposed trust in him.  Under the Pardo test, neither titles nor 
job descriptions dictate whether the person held a position of 
trust.  Rather, Pardo provides factors for applying the 
enhancement, mindful that the purpose of the enhancement is 
to “punish ‘insiders’ who abuse their positions rather than 
those who take advantage of an available opportunity.”  Pardo, 
25 F.3d at 1192; see also United States v. DeMuro, 677 F.3d 
550, 567-68 (3d Cir. 2012).  By barring consideration of 
context (which the Pardo factors appropriately considered), the 
Majority has narrowed the circumstances when the text of the 
Guidelines and application notes would plainly support 
applying the enhancement.  Particularly in the context of public 
trust, whether that person abuses his position of public trust 
requires consideration of context-specific matters such as the 
nature of the relationship between the defendant and the public 
and the public’s expectations for someone who holds a position 
like the defendant, regardless of his job title or actual duties. 
 
 Considering the context and the relationship between 
Douglas’s authority and the public’s expectations, which 
include the fact that Douglas worked at an international airport 
subject to TSA regulations that gave him unfettered access to 
secured areas, his position provided him the means to “commit 
a difficult-to-detect wrong” because it permitted him to bypass 
security measures, which dramatically reduced the likelihood 
that luggage containing the drugs he was smuggling would be 
searched.8  See Pardo, 25 F.3d at 1192 (emphasis omitted).  He 
                                                                
 8 That Douglas could have been subjected to random 
searches does not alter this conclusion, because Douglas was 
still trusted to move past security at will without inspection the 
vast majority of the time, and hence, he was largely deferred 
to.   
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was vested with discretion in exactly the area that related to 
“the object of the wrongful act”—he was able to move freely 
into the terminal without inspection.  Id.   Finally, it is 
reasonable to infer that airport leadership and government 
authorities granted him a security clearance in “reliance on 
[his] integrity,” trusting that he would not abuse it to 
circumvent airport security.  Id.  Thus, Douglas held a position 
of public trust as contemplated under § 3B1.3, which he 
abused.   
 
III 
 
 Because the Pardo test comports with the Sentencing 
Guidelines, and because the Majority’s test is unduly 
restrictive in its prohibition against considering the context 
within which the defendant exercises discretion, and fails to 
recognize the unique nature of what constitutes a position of 
public trust and how it can be abused, we respectfully dissent.9   
                                                                
9 This case may provide an occasion for the Sentencing 
Commission to review § 3B1.3.  Much has changed since 
§ 3B1.3 was first enacted and even since it was last amended.  
For instance, when Application Note 1 excluded a bank teller 
from being subjected to the enhancement, a teller did not have 
computer access to a customer’s entire banking record.  Now, 
like the DMV employee referenced in Application Note 2, a 
teller has access to and is entrusted with personal identifying 
and bank information.  Similarly, in this era where cyber and 
national security concerns are paramount, the Commission 
may wish to consider whether the enhancement should apply 
to those who hold positions that provide the means to 
compromise cyber or national security even where their core 
job duties may not require them to interface with cyber or 
15 
                                                                
national security matters.  Finally, the Commission may wish 
to define the phrase “position of public trust” and provide 
guidance as to whether the context in which a defendant carried 
out a crime can be considered in determining whether he holds 
a position of trust. 
